General Perception; ‘Soft power has little real utility in international diplomacy. In fact, the power to shape outcomes in international diplomacy is simply a function of the effective use of military and economic resources. 
 

This piece requires an examination of the validity of the statement in the question that soft power is of little use compared to the ‘hard’ alternatives. In order to assess this claim, firstly a brief outline of what constitutes soft power will be put forward. This will be followed by a historical analysis of the American theory of hard power, and why they have been pre eminent in putting forward the view expressed in the question. The third paragraph will use historical and contemporary examples to show how recent use of military and economic hard power has often failed to shape the required outcomes. This will be followed by an attempt to show the validity of soft power diplomatic theory, and give examples of its successes.

      It was Joseph S Nye who is mainly credited with having put forward the modernly accepted view of soft power. He describes soft power thusly, ‘Many leadership skills such as creating a vision, communicating it, attracting and choosing people, delegating and forming coalitions depend on what I call soft power.’ In the contemporary situation soft power has been used in conjunction with American relations with Iran and North Korea, but Iran especially, where independent observers and the EU urge the US to open diplomatic ties. Nye is forceful in putting forward the severe limitations of hard power, ‘In some situations those who hold high office, command force, or possess wealth are not the most powerful. That is what revolutions are all about. David A Baldwin looked into international diplomacy, and its relationship to power. He says, ‘All politics is power politics in the sense that all politics includes power.’ He continues to say that the states with the most military power are determined to be great powers, and the globe is seen as a pawn in the game of international diplomacy conducted between the great powers. Baldwin was influenced by Harold Laswell and Abraham Kaplan who agree that power is the ability of actor A to change the power of actor B. Behavior could include beliefs, attitudes, expectations and pre-dispositions to act. Baldwin concludes that too much notice is given to power as being purely down to military strength. The Guardian looking at the concept of soft power also concluded, ‘Soft power is to the American military machine what the idea of the new man is to traditional masculinity. It is, according to the new European catechism, a more civilized way of doing things – one based on rational argument, proper procedure and bureaucratic haggling. As the pre-dominant world power the use of hard versus soft power by America is vital. Nye, in putting forward the theory of soft power has argued that America relies too heavily on hard power versus soft.¹

      America has been seen as a nation that has relied heavily on hard power. In 1899 Theodore Roosevelt commented, ‘Of course, our whole national history has been one of expansion.’ America has put forward the view that its diplomatic tactics were a necessary reaction to aggressive external powers. Historian Ernest May commented, ‘Some nations achieve greatness; the United States had greatness thrust upon it.’ AJ Bacevich outlines the historical thrust of this aspect of American hard power, ‘In this view American Policy is a response to external factions. The United States does not act in accordance with some pre-determined logic; it reacts to circumstances and examples. The Twentieth Century examples serve to corroborate this view. During the 1914-18 war America was neutral, until drawn into the war by Germany. The Second World War saw America similarly drawn in by Japanese aggression. America seeks to portray itself as reluctant in its extension, seeing Russia as the sole aggressor drawing them into the cold war. William Appleman Williams was pre eminent in arguing that America has been central in defining this century’s concept of hard power. He argues that the closing down of the frontier by the 1890s, and the upcoming economic crisis meant America was obliged to look further afield to continue its growth, ‘Expanding the market place enlarged the area of freedom. Expanding the area of freedom enlarged the market place.’ Williams stated the terms of the open door policy, ‘Openness became a precondition of freedom and democracy. It implied stability and security.’ This open door policy legitimized, ‘the endless expansion of the American frontier in the name of self defense, progress and peace.’² The extent to which America is the pre dominant purveyor of hard power is backed up by its spending compared to the combined European Union states. The whole of the EU collectively spends $170 billion on defense, whilst the US nearly doubles this at $300 billions. Equally, Niall Ferguson argues that the US could increase its military strength spending by 60 per cent without exceeding the proportion of Gross Domestic Product by more than 5 per cent. 

      It has been established above that America has been the pre dominant purveyor of hard power in international diplomacy. Below it will be shown the extent to which this has failed, and therefore the extent to which the view posed in the question is incorrect. Joseph Nye again lays out the ineffectitude of America’s use of hard power, ‘The sheer might of United States is unquestioned; US troops are stationed in some 130 countries around the globe, and in opposing a warring world that dares to challenge it on a level playing field. But as America’s military superiority has increased, so its ability to persuade is at low ebb in many parts of the world, even among its best allies. In the past there have been many examples in the failure of American hard power. In the war on Vietnam, America sought to reject the Communist choice of the North Vietnamese people, and enforce their preference, ultimately leading to withdrawal and defeat. Equally, America has often attempted to use economic coercion against its perceived enemies. Joseph Nye, in countering a claim by the Heritage Foundation that economic sanctions were an example of soft power, exclaimed, ‘There is nothing soft about sanctions if you are on the receiving end. They are clearly intended to coerce and are thus a form of hard power. Equally these sanctions have often been a failure. In Iraq the economic sanctions against the regime of President Saddam Hussein did nothing to lead to the toppling of his leadership, but increased hardship upon an already tortured people. In addition, in Cuba a forty nine year economic embargo was met by forty nine years of Fidel Castro Presidency, and a sense of grievance that increased international sympathy for the Castro regime. It is in the era of the current Bush presidency that the total unwillingness of the United States to consider anything above hard power has reached its zenith. Ivo Daalden looked at the philosophy of the Bush presidency and concluded, ‘He relied on the unilateral exercise of American power rather than on international law and institutions to get his way. He championed a pro active doctrine of pre emption and de emphasized the reactive strategies of deterrence and containment.’ This is the expansionist hard policy that led to the problems America and Britain encountered in Iraq, ‘The Bush philosophy turned John Quincy Adams on his head and argued that the United States should aggressively go abroad searching for monsters to destroy. That was the logic behind the Iraq war. In fact Secretary of Defense under President Bush, Donald Rumsfeld was asked about diplomatic soft options and responded, ‘I don’t know what it means. The failure of the Bush philosophy has been shown in the vast decline in America’s standing in the world. Assessing the Iraq war in relation to the standing of the leaders that chose to go for hard power The Independent concluded, ‘George Bush is the most unpopular President since opinion polls began, mainly because of Iraq. Tony Blair, his partner in this reckless adventure, has already gone; those in a position to know believe he would still be Prime Minister had it not been for the war.’ But more important than popularity, they argued that America’s policies were wrong because the hard option had been counter productive, ‘No one in Washington appeared to have calculated that to unseat Saddam, whom the US once supported as a bulwark against the Iranians, would empower the majority community in Iraq, the Shias, or that many of them would look to the worlds only Shia nation, Iran. However, the popularity of the United States is equally important as this second point because it impacts on the ability for America to act in the way it wants internationally. In Great Britain support for the US in 1999 was 83 per cent, in 2006 56 per cent. Alarmingly, in one of the few Muslim allies support fell in Turkey from 52 per cent to 12 per cent. America, at this moment is seeking to deal with the issue of Iranian nuclear enrichment, yet out of fifteen countries including Britain, Spain, Russia, Egypt, Pakistan and China, only Germany and the US saw Iran as a bigger threat to world peace than the American actions in Iraq. In Britain, the main ally in the action, two thirds of people saw America being in Iraq as more dangerous than Iran. It is also important to note that this is a general problem of American hard power and not just caused by the one off aberration of Iraq. Prior to the invasion of Iraq one in three Britons polled believed Bush to be a bigger threat to their safety than Saddam Hussein. Republican Representative Henry Hyde concluded, ‘How is it that the country that invented Hollywood and Madison Avenue has allowed such a destructive and parodied image of itself to become the intellectual coin of the realm overseas.

      However, there are soft options that have shown to be successful that repudiate the Bush strategy. Leigh Armistad points out the importance of information in the internet age, ‘Information power is also hard to categorize because it cuts across all other military economic, social and political power resources. The traditional notion of soft power is most likely to be successful though bargaining and diplomacy. Implacable enemies South and North Korea have achieved greater ties after diplomatic rapprochement. South Korean President Roh visited North Korea and China furthering trade cooperation. Equally, China has received great rewards from economically expanding into the regional and wider economy after diplomatic moves, ‘Trade relations have expanded such that South Korea’s semiconductor and Chinese manufactured goods fill homes around the globe. Equally the chances of stopping the North Korean nuclear program originally looked remote. However, America first entered talks alongside China and the Koreans, promising fuel aid. In addition they then offered $95 million in aid to help Korean energy, resulting in a halt to the program and continued diplomatic agreements. Britain found the quick release of its Iranian hostages by soft power as well. Will Hutton commented, ‘By arguing, talking and repudiating saber rattling, we have paradoxically, weakened Iran’s argument that it is an injured innocent and strengthened our own that the international community should be watchful of this power and its nuclear ambitions soft power works.

      Soft power refers to a system of exporting values and engaging diplomatically with the outside world, as opposed to hard power in the form of sanctions and military threats. In recent history America has rightly been seen as defining the concept and the use of hard power diplomacy. During the Bush Presidency this tactic has been used to the exclusion of all others. However, previously in Cuba and Vietnam hard power was shown to be flawed, and has lessened American support for and the success of the current American President. In contrast, their have been many examples of the use of soft power to great effect. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that soft power has little real utility, and fatal to over-estimate the usefulness of military and economic hard options.