لراوبر ویب پاڼه لراوبر يو افغان – تازه خبرونه
BREAKING THE MOULD
A CASE OF PEACE AGAINST WAR
“My religion is truth, love and
service to God and humanity. Every religion that has come into the world has
brought the message of love and brotherhood. Those who are indifferent to the
welfare of their fellowmen, whose hearts are empty of love, they do not know the
meaning of religion.”
‘Faith is a battle. The faithful
fights to the end. He needs no weapon’ Abdul Ghaffar Khan
“It was Ramadan that the Quran
was revealed. It was in Ramadan that the permission for jehad was granted by
Allah. It was in Ramadan that the battle of Badr, the first open conflict
between Islam and heathenism, was fought and won by 313 Muslims (against 900 in
A.D. 634) and again it was Ramadan that 10,000 Muslims under the holy prophet
conquered Mecca (in A.D. 630) and established the kingdom of Heaven and
commonwealth of Islam in Arabia. The Muslim league is fortunate that it is
starting its action in this holy month”
‘Today we have forged a pistol
and are in a position to use it.’ Mohammad Ali Jinnah – ‘Direct Action Day’
After eight years of miscalculations
and lost opportunities in Afghanistan following the unlawful Bush-Blair invasion
of October 2001, the West had begun to chalk out a ‘new strategy’ in order to
extract itself from what seems to becoming a quagmire. However, while portraying
its apparent ‘benevolent’ intention toward the Afghan nation, Britain was in
fact carrying out its own agenda in the region: the protection and consolidation
of the colonial legacy. Rattled by a new anti-colonial approach to international
hot spots of instability by the new Obama administration, the British
establishment had embarked upon waging of a new ‘Great Game’ versus the White
House.
Speaking to
the United Kingdom
International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) on Friday 4th September
2009, Prime Minister Gordon Brown highlighted the reasons for Britain’s role in
Afghanistan. In a five thousands words long initial document and followed by
subsequent statements, the British Prime Minister set out his vision concerning
the ongoing problems for the international community in Afghanistan. He spoke in
length about the Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and terrorists. He cited the high number
of casualties sustained by British soldiers in Helmand Province. He said,
however, they were justified. ‘Each time I have to ask myself’, Gordon Brown
emphasized, ‘if we can
justify sending our young men and women to fight for this cause … And my
answer has always been yes.
For when the security of our country is at stake we can not walk away.’
In his speech, the Prime Minister
had dwelt on al-Qaeda and terrorism, their activities and the real or perceived
future danger to international security thereof. Instead of touching upon its
causes, he had spoken in detail about the symptoms of terrorism. I
do not intend here to say more about what Gordon Brown has said in his
statements. I will focus on, in brief, however, on what he has not said.
Firstly: Prime Minister Gordon
Brown has conveyed as if Al-Qaeda and international terrorism was borne eight
years ago, in 2001. Whereas the fact is that the father of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin
Laden, (contrary to the wishes of the Afghans) was recruited as a result of an
‘initiative’ by the Inter Service Intelligence of Pakistan (ISI) at the
beginning of 1980 to fight jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Bin Laden’s
participation in jihad as a key organizer of the Arabs
international ‘Islamic
Brigade’ was welcomed by the CIA and MI6, paid by Saudi Arabia and embraced by
the then Pakistan’s Martial Law Administrator, Gen. Zia ul-Haq. A man of
considerable wealth himself, backed by the Royal Saudi family and close family
friend and business partner of the George Bush clan, Bin Laden enriched many
Pakistani generals and bureaucrats. It was bin Laden, who had helped the
Pakistani junta in destroying Afghanistan and the Afghan nation. It was bin
Laden, who was kept by the mercenary Generals to conquer for them "the promised
land", Kashmir, too. And it was bin Laden who introduced Nawaz Sharif of
Pakistan (at Sharif’s request) to the Saudi Royals.
Secondly: Terrorism in reality–and
in particular ideologically and religiously based terrorism–was borne a long
time ago than the last three decades. Its roots lay in Britain’s colonial
history in India. It was the product of the ‘divide and rule’ policy of the East
India Company (EIC). It began by proxy in the 19th century. Working through an
employee of the EIC in Bushir, Persia – a naturalized British citizen of Persian
origin – Mehdi Ali Khan, Lord Wellesley established contact with the court of
Fateh Ali Shah Qajar. In a letter, Wellesley asked the Persian King to keep the
Afghan Abdali King, Zaman-Shah in perpetual check as to preclude him from
returning to India.’ Mehdi Ali Khan, ‘a born intriguer,’ had once
reported to the Qajar of false account of ‘atrocities committed by Sunni
Afghans to the Shiites of
Lahore,
to arouse the anger of and provoke Fateh Ali Shah. And ‘if Zaman-Shah was
checked,’ he wrote, a ‘service will be rendered to God and man’
[1]
This
paved the way for Britain to send a ‘mission’ in 1797, headed by Capt. J.
Malcolm, to Persia. The outcome for Britain was spectacular success. According
to Sir John Kaye, ‘every difficulty melted away before the British Gold.’ As a
result a treaty of alliance between the two sides was concluded. The Qajar
undertook ‘to lay waste and desolate the Afghan dominions,’ and to do every
thing ‘to ruin and humble the above-mentioned
nation.’ The British
Government agreed to furnish
the Persian army with weapons and equipment. It did not take long for Persia to
attack the Abdali kingdom’s western ‘buffer state’ of Khorasan. In a report to
Lord Wellesley in October 1800, Capt. Malcolm wrote that ‘You may be assured
that Zaman-Shah Abdali can do nothing in India before the setting of the rains
of 1801… and by the blessing of God he will, for some years to come, be too much
engaged in this quarter to think of any other.’
In May 1838 the head of Foreign and
Political department in Calcutta, William MacNaghten, visited the Sikh leader,
Ranjit Sing, in Lahore. As a result, on 26 June, a tripartite ‘Treaty of
Alliance and Friendship’ was signed by Maharaja Ranjit Singh, Shah-Shoja and
Lord Auckland at Simla, ‘with the approval and agreement of the British
Government’[2]
Under the treaty Ranjit Singh would supply the army, Britain money and advisors
and Shah-Shoja – who had been living as a British pensioner in India for three
decades – would be the puppet.
This so called treaty was one of
the most peculiar ‘piece of falsehood’ and deception. The parties to the
signature were: A warlord, Ranjit Singh, who had been built up by the British
and used as a cat’s-paw against the Afghan Amir; Shah-Shoja, a fugitive prisoner
at the hands of and humiliated by the Sikhs and a super-power of the time,
Britain. It was religious animosity between the Afghans and the Sikhs which the
British deepened and exploited. The plan of conspiracy was thus satisfactorily
hatched, the players ready, and the question now was how to set the stage on
which the drama was to be acted.
On 1st
October Lord Auckland issued a statement from Simla, the summer capital of the
British, in which he declared that ‘…Dost Mohammad (the Afghan Amir) had made an
unprovoked attack on Ranjit Singh … and
that in concert with Persia
(absolutely
farfetched and untrue, just a
pretext) had avowed
schemes of
aggrandizement and ambition
injurious to the security and peace of the frontier of India … therefore
the government of India saw no alternative but to remove the treacherous Dost.’[3]
Realizing
that he had been bullied into an adventure of no success, the Sikh leader,
Ranjit Sing, at the final stages did not commit his soldier to the enterprise.
Auckland, however, thought it best that Britain alone should undertake the
project. The Governor-General deluded himself that Shah-Shoja will be received
with open arms by the Afghans if accompanied by ‘the invincible troops of the
British Indian army.’[4]
A British academic, T.A. Heathcote,
– without any doubt having in mind the pretext under which Tony Blair’s
government imposed a fifth war (yes a fifth war see later) on Afghanistan at the
beginning of the 21st Century – wrote in his book (Published in
2003): ‘British experts on Afghanistan really believed that Shah Shuja would be
welcomed by the Afghans … British influence would be used to try and settle the
feuds that had disturbed the peace and prosperity of Afghanistan for years
past.’
A grand sounding military force,
‘The Indus Army’, was made ready at Firozepur in the Punjab to invade
Afghanistan. As usual and as at all times those recruited to the army in the
class and race ridden Britain was the poor and wretched of the society. It was
these who were thrown in to the theatres of death and destruction to sacrifice
their own lives and those of their victims in the course of aggressive and
unjust wars for the greedy and arrogant interests of the few.
On
25 April 1839 the invasion force (The First Anglo-Afghan War) entered Kandahar
and the city was occupied by Gen. William Nott. General Nott, who thought of his
troops as ‘one equal a thousand Afghans,’ became the commander of Kandahar
garrison and
committed innumerable atrocities.
As an example of the
occupier’s colonial barbarity, ‘one
political’ destroyed a village and massacred its 23 inhabitants
‘because he thought they looked insultingly at him.’
[5]
A
political team to ‘advise’ the puppet Shah-Shoja was selected. MacNaghten,
due to his ‘wide experience’ was appointed as envoy ‘and Minister on the part of
the government of India at the court of Shah-Shuja.’ And the then 33 year old
Lt. Colonel Alexander Burnes became his deputy.
News of Lord Auckland’s
‘foresight and statesmanship’ pleased every one in London. ‘Chest full’ of
medals were awarded. Prime Minister, Lord Palmerstone, wrote: ‘The glorious
success of Auckland in Afghanistan will cow all Asia and make every thing easy
for us.’[6]
The
Afghan Amir, Dost Mohammad Khan, was bundled and dispatched to India for an
‘honorable’ exile.
It was all quiet. Winter came and
passed. There was no stir. But during April 1841 the situation changed. The
people in Kalat, south west of Kabul, began an uprising which spread fast to
Ghazni and Kandahar. William MacNaghten, having spent much time in service in
India, did not recognize the gravity of the situation. And nor did Alexander
Burnes. He dismissed the uprising as a ‘tempest in a teapot.’
Peshawar
and Kabul, however, was not India. A junior officer in the ‘Indus Army’,
Lt. Eyre, was more realistic and reflected the true state of affairs. The
lieutenant who kept a day to day account of the winter 1841-1842, wrote that Sir
William MacNaghten ‘by his representations as to the general feelings of the
peoples towards us, not only deluded himself, but misled the General [Elphinstone]
in
council…The unwelcome truth was
soon forced upon us, that in the
whole Afghan nation we could not
recon on a single friend.’[7]
On 2nd November 1841 the
headquarters of the British army at Sherpur, was attacked. On 6 January 1842 the
‘army of the
Indus’ began to pull out
of Kabul. Britain’s military annals are full of the gory details. All the 16,500
evacuees – composed of 4,500 officers and men and 12,000 camp followers were
killed – except for a number of hostages.
John Key, who wrote two volumes on
the battle and which were published in 1851, some ten-years after the disaster,
wrote: ‘The Afghans are an unforgiving race and everywhere from Candahar to
Caubul and from Caubul to Peshawar are traces of the injuries we have inflicted
upon the tribes.’[8]
Its consequence was thus the atrocious disaster of January 1842.
Emotions and the feeling of revenge
within the British establishment were overwhelming. The plucky Lady Sale wrote
that ‘Now is the time to strike … I hope that I shall live to see the British
flag once more triumphant in Afghanistan … only let us first show them that we
can conquer them and humble their treacherous chiefs in the dust.’
The new
Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough, who had issued instructions to the British
commanders in Afghanistan to withdraw, made the withdrawal subject to the
restoration of the British Army prestige. ‘The British’, T.A. Heathcote, wrote,
‘had to maintain their record of always winning the last battle.’
An ‘Army of Retribution’ under
Gen. Pollock from Jalalabad in the east, and Nott from Kandahar in
the south arrived in Kabul on 17 and 19 September. Revenge was unleashed against
Kabul city and its citizens. A political officer with General Nott’s force,
Henry Rawilson, wrote: ‘The cry went forth that Kabul was given up to plunder.
Troops and camp followers streamed into the city, pillaging shops and applying
torches to houses.
Guilty and innocent
alike,
including the friendly
Kizilbashis, saw their homes and businesses were destroyed, and large areas of
Kabul were laid low.’[9]
At a place where refugees from the
capital had gathered, every Afghan male past puberty was killed and women were
raped. In the words of a young officer ‘tears, supplications were of no
avail; fierce oaths were the only answer; the musket was deliberately raised,
the trigger pulled, and happy was he who fell dead … in fact we are nothing but
hired assassins.’[10]
Dost-Mohammad Khan returned from a
three-year exile in India and began his second reign in April 1843.
Britain had left behind a physically, economically and psychologically ruined
Afghanistan. She had concluded, at least at this juncture, not to
interfere. Lord Ellenborough had ‘already made it known that Britain hankered
after no further imperial adventures on the west bank of the Indus and "would
leave it to the Afghans themselves to create a government amidst the anarchy
which is the consequences of their crimes.’[11]
[Emphasis added] (Compare with 2009)
At the end of July 1839, Britain’s
‘loyal ally’, Ranjit Singh, died. It took less than a decade for the EIC to
burry his Kingdom of Punjab, too. Following a string of inter-family contests
for succession, the last ‘child maharaja’, Dulip Sing, ‘knelt before the
Governor-General, Lord Harding, and begged his forgiveness which was granted.’
Escorted by the British with great pomp and fan-fare, Dulip Singh was installed
as the legitimate heir on the throne of Ranjit Singh. On 30 March 1849, Dulip
Singh held his last court at Lahore, at which he signed away all claims to the
rule of the Punjab. A proclamation by the then EIC Governor-General, Lord
Dalhousie, annexing the Punjab, was read out. ‘The Koh-i-Noor diamond was
swiftly retrieved and presented to Queen Victoria, in the possession of whose
successors it remains.’[12]
Thus Britain swallowed the Punjab.
With the
death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh – a major actor in the regional drama – and the
demise of the Sikh state the EIC moved in to Peshawar and other areas in eastern
Afghanistan to the west bank of the Indus River. Britain’s forward advance by
proxy to reach Central Asia was now replaced by direct action. In order to move
in directly in to the Afghan territories, the British advanced guard in the
guise of Fakirs (holy-men) and doctors had already been busy preparing the
ground since 1842. In 1849 they had presence in Peshawar, Hazara, Kohat, Bannu
and the Dirajat and had been advancing step-by-step ‘through local chiefs … To
all appearances the British rule was welcomed. My old friends, the chiefs of the
Eusofzye country’, said George Lawrence … came in to tender their allegiance,
expressing their great joy at the annexation of the Punjab to the British
territory.’[13]
According to Olaf Caroe, ‘The arrival of the British
in Peshawar in 1849 … was hailed with enthusiasm as a deliverance from the
hated Sikhashahi
[Sikh-Dom]’[14]
In 1857
the Afghan Amir, Dost-Mohammad Khan, remained neutral in the anti-British
uprising in India, ‘the Indian Mutiny.’ The Governor of Punjab, John Lawrence,
had advised the British Government that the Afghan territories should be handed
over to the Afghans. ‘Peshawar is not India’, wrote Lawrence, ‘it be handed to
Dost … (thus) capitalizing on his friendship he had pledged in 1857 … Peshawar
would accomplish his heart’s desire and would do more to make the Afghans
friendly to us than any thing else.’[15]
However, against the Amir’s expectation, the victorious Britain did not return
the trans-Indus Afghan territories to Afghanistan. Instead, in August that year
Lord Canning wrote to Lawrence: ‘… hold on to Peshawar to the last … it is the
anchor of Punjab and if you
take it up the whole ship would drift to sea.’
The colonial army embarked upon
subjugating the people through engaging in ‘Afghan hunting’, and carried
out scores of ‘punitive
expeditions’
against what Britain called the ‘shameless cruel savage’ Afghans. Charles
Miller, in his book ‘Khyber’, (1977), wrote that there ‘still stands an ancient
tree in Bannu, its single remaining limb is deeply scarred by the rope marks of
the unaccountable hangings that Nicolson ordered in his kangaroo courts. He had
thousands of lesser offenders flogged senseless.’[16]
In June 1863 Amir Dost Mohammad
Khan died after twenty year of frustrated rule. He had left behind a sea of
trouble to his young son, Sher-Ali Khan. A war of succession ensued. Britain
‘played a double role,’ backing Sher-Ali Khan’s younger brother against him,
thus there were two parallel powers in Kabul for some time. The Indian Viceroy
at the time, John Lawrence, an appointee of the Liberal government, watched with
keen interest. The Liberals firmly believed that Indus was the natural border of
India from where it could be best defended. The most firm supporter of this
school, John Lawrence (Indian viceroy, 1864) who, up to the end, adhered to the
opinion that in order to defend India Britain’s best bid was to win the hearts
of the Afghan nation. He believed that the British position in the sub-continent
would be far stronger if it ‘acknowledged traditional Afghan claims and
pulled her own north-west boundary into the east bank of the Indus.’[17]
[Emphasis added] "I do not believe," Lawrence said, "we shall have any
difficulties or complications with the Afghans if we only leave them alone. The
greater the enmity between the two parties in Kabul, the less likely are they to
meddle with us.’[18]
John Lawrence was succeeded by Lord
Mayo. The Afghan Amir Sher-Ali Khan had developed cordial personal relations
with the new Viceroy. Following a meeting with Lord Mayo in Ambala on 27 March
1869, the Amir wrote him a letter in which he stated: ‘if it pleases God, as
long as I am alive, or as long as my government exists, the foundation of
friendship and good-will between his and the powerful British government will
not be weakened.’[19]
However,
this personal friendship and unwarranted warmth between the two came to an
abrupt end with the assassination of Lord Mayo in 1872. He was replaced by Lord
Northbrook. The Russians, who in 1842 were beyond the Aral Sea some one thousand
miles away from Central Asia, were now at the Oxus. In order to counter the
‘Russian threat’ to India, two schools of thought had developed in Britain:
Namely those who advocated the ‘forward policy’, and those who believed
in practicing ‘masterly inactivity.’ The adherents of the first school
prescribed to, by hook or by crook, the continuation of gradual penetration into
eastern Afghanistan’s provinces to ‘advance to the Hindu Kush or even the Oxus
itself.’ And the other, which was more cautious and did not want the repetition
of the 1842 disaster, supported a closed door policy with Kabul.[20]
In 1869, however, a five year long
conference began between London and St. Petersburg in order to settle issues
related to the Central Asian territories between the two advancing imperial
powers. By January 1873 an agreement was reached between William Gladstone’s
government and the Tsarist Russia under which Afghanistan remained ‘outside the
Russian and inside the British sphere of influence.’[21]
In February 1874 Gladstone’s
Liberal government was replaced by the Conservative Disraeli under whose
clutches the edifice of the ‘Closed Border Policy’ was crushed and the
‘Forward Policy’ prevailed. The ‘hawks’ had won. The Secretary of
State for India, Lord Salisbury, instructed the Governor-General of India, Lord
Northbrook, to open talks with the Afghan Amir. Sher-Ali Khan, on establishing
British missions in Kabul and Herat. Northbrook was opposed to the scheme and
resigned. In his letter of resignation, Northbrook wrote to
Lord Salisbury: ‘The Amir’s
rule, if not universally popular, was strong and … unchallenged. The Amir in his
foreign policy had hitherto complied
with British wishes and he showed
no desire to seek the friendship of the Russians. But the
thing he dreaded most of all
was any possible interference in his internal affairs, which would be signaled
by the arrival of a British Resident. "We deprecate, as involving serious danger
to the peace of Afghanistan and to the interests of the British Empire in India,
the execution under present circumstances, of the instructions in your
Lordship’s dispatch.’[22]
Lord Edward-Bulwer-Lytton was
appointed the Viceroy of India. Within a short time of his arrival, he had
embarked upon planning ‘not only the annexation of
Afghanistan but…an
attack on Russia in Central Asia with a force of twenty thousand men. ‘The
prospect of war with
Russia’, he wrote to
Salisbury, the Secretary of State for India, in September 1876, immensely
excites me, but so far as India is concerned, does not alarm me. ‘We are twice
as strong as Russia in this part of the world,’ Lytton noted, should war
be declared, a British force should be sent to Central Asia. The Khanates could
be raised against Russia ‘and put a sea of fire between us.’ In fact so
far as India is concerned, no event would be more fortunate than a war with
Russia next spring.’
Thus
Lytton was hankering for war. He wrote a letter to the Afghan Amir informing him
of the dispatch of a delegation headed by Lewis Pelly to Kabul to discuss
‘topics of mutual interest’ with the Afghan government. The British
delegation was already on its way, Lytton told him in the letter. The ‘topics
of mutual interest’ were to establish a British resident at his court, who
would advise him on internal and external affairs and thus discourage him
from unpopular oppressive acts at home, or ill-considered aggressive
acts abroad.’[23]
(Emphasis added)
What in
fact the British intention was, was to station its military forces at the heart
of the Hindu Kush; bring Kandahar, Herat and Balkh under Britain’s direct
influence; split Shinwar and Mohmand from Nangarhar province; severe Peshin and
Sibi from
Kandahar and annex them to ‘British
Sistan’ and obtain control over the strategic Khyber, Kurram and Bolan passes.
Lord Lytton did not believe in Afghanistan to be a ‘buffer’ state. Afghanistan
should be ‘either with
Britain or Russia’,
he argued, ‘otherwise it should be wiped out of the map and divided between
the two imperial powers.’[Emphasis added]
Sher-Ali Khan pleaded that the
Russians had also been exerting pressure on him to allow the Tsar’s envoys in
Afghanistan. He passed on a letter from General Kaufman, the Tsar’s military
commander of Central Asia, to the Viceroy. Competing with Britain, the Tsarist
authorities too wanted to ‘replace Islamic barbarism’ by European
civilization. All the same, Lytton could not be dissuaded from implementing his
project. However, Sher-Ali did not allow the British delegation to go to Kabul.
This ‘disgraceful act’ angered the Viceroy. ‘Intolerant of opposition,’
Lord Lytton characterized the Afghan leader as ‘a savage with a touch
of insanity,’
[24]
Advising
his Minister Ata Mohammad, in Kabul, the Viceroy outlined in an ultimatum:
‘Afghanistan should not have contact with foreign countries, in particular with
Russia without informing the British … Kabul should accept English
representatives in Kabul, Heart … British nationals should be allowed freely to
come and go through Afghanistan and Kabul should accept responsibility for their
security. British missions should be allowed in Afghanistan from time to time.
If the Amir accepts these conditions, he could send a representative to Peshawar
otherwise there is no need for further contacts.’ The British government, Lytton
threatened ... will take and reach an agreement
with the Russians to wipe out Afghanistan from
the map of the world…’[25][Emphasis
added]
Thus
Lytton had made up his mind; the pretext was there and he was ready to engage in
his forthcoming adventure. Britain was bent on accomplishing her well-defined
objective, the extent of
which was the Oxus as the ‘ultimate
boundary, and Balkh, Maymana and Herat for its main posts’ for the
empire’s security.[26]
He was assured of his power by an
officer on his personnel staff, Col. George Pomeroy Colley, who believed that
with the development of new technology in weaponry (Tony Blair’s invasion of
2001 was also, perhaps, influenced by the advanced war technology) and the
conduct of war, ‘a single British regiment,…armed with breech loaders and
plentifully supplied with ammunition, should be able to march at will through
the length and breadth of Afghanistan..’[27]
In
a letter dated 12 October 1878 addressed to Lytton, Britain’s Foreign Secretary,
Lord Cranbrook wrote that ‘henceforth
Afghanistan cannot remain to exist
as a whole.’ On 21
November British troops attacked Afghanistan (the Second Anglo-Afghan War) on
three fronts. ‘The die is cast,’ Lytton informed London in a telegram. In reply
Cranbrook wrote to the Viceroy that ‘Your great work has begun – God give you
a good deliverance.’
In the
face of the British invasion, Amir-Sher Ali left Kabul for Mazar-e Sharif to
proceed to Russian Turkestan to ask the Tsar Alexander II for assistance. His
attempt was in vain and he died on 21 February 1879.
Mohammad Yaqub, the Amir’s son,
was left behind to face one of the critical phases in Afghanistan’s history. The
British favorite new Amir, Yaqub Khan, was summoned by the invading forces. He
arrived on 8 May 1879 at Gandomak, ‘where the men of the 44th Foot died
after the 1842 retreat from
Kabul,’
and began ‘negotiations’ with Britain’s political envoy accompanying the
invading army, Luis Cavagnari. As a result one of the most notorious agreements
in Afghanistan’s history and which, henceforth, was imposed on every British
paid
servant Afghan puppet Amir – in
the
course of the 19th and that
of the beginning of the 20th century. Lytton’s dream of creating a ‘scientific
frontier’ for India seemed to have come true. Congratulations, celebration and
awards followed. Regiments were awarded battle honors; soldiers were decorated
and generals got their full chests of medals. Cavagnari won knighthood and was
appointed Britain’s Minister to Kabul. Sir Louis arrived in Kabul with great
pomp to take his post. The date was 24 July 1879.
He was confident and devoted to
Britain’s triumph in her march towards Central Asia. Replying to a statement
made by John Lawrence in England that Cavagnari and his staff…will be murdered
– every one of them.., Sir Louis said: ‘if my death sets the Red Line on the
Hindu Kush, I do not
care.’
All was quiet. In a telegram to
Simla on 2 September 1879, Cavagnari wrote: ‘All well.’ On the 3rd it was not.
The British residency in lower Bala-Hesar of Kabul was surrounded by a unit of
Afghan soldiers. Cavagnari, along with members of the British mission in Kabul
was killed. The residency was set ablaze. In a telegram to Simla, Yaqub Khan
wrote to the Viceroy that ‘I have lost my friend the envoy…and also
my kingdom.’
[28]
Lytton’s reaction was immediate.
General Roberts, whose army was close to Kabul, was instructed to advance on the
capital. On 6 October 1879 Roberts moved in with a massive force. Afghanistan
was destined to be dealt with the force of arms and … ‘undisputed supremacy of
British power from Indus to Oxus.., was to be established. In his instructions
to Roberts, Lytton advised that it was immaterial if innocent people were the
victims. That could not be helped.., he had instructed, "every Afghan brought
to death I shall regard as one scoundrel the less in a nest of scoundrelism."’
[29] General Roberts did just that. In rebuffing some reports in London’s
press which wrote about the style and scale of ‘atrocities’ committed by
British forces, Roberts
stated ‘I am afraid I shall hang
them,
notwithstanding all the
rubbish the “Spectator” and the “Statesman” write.’
Yaqub Khan abdicated. On 13 October
a ‘victory’ parade was held by Roberts in Kabul. Now ‘I am really king
of Kabul,’
wrote General Roberts to his wife in London. However, he was not to be ‘King
of Kabul’
for long. On the morning of 23 December a huge fire was lit on the Asmayi
Mountain to the south-west of the city that could be seen from far off
distances. This signaled the first sign of declaration of a general
attack on the British forces at Sherpur. In January 1880 Roberts announced that
the British were withdrawing from Afghanistan and would recognize any one who
took control of the country.
On 8 April 1880 the Conservative
government was replaced by the Liberals. Lord Ripon was appointed the new
Viceroy of India by William Gladstone. The Viceroy, who arrived in Simla on 8
June, was instructed to find a way out of Afghanistan’s ‘quagmire’ before the
arrival of the winter. It was Amir Abdul-Rahman Khan ‘the Iron Amir’ who
provided such ‘a way out’ for the British. The new Amir agreed to conduct his
foreign relations through the colonial authorities, and was installed in Kabul.
And after avenging the British Army defeat of July 17, 1879 at Maywand, Britain
left Afghanistan in August 1880.
Relations
between the Amir and Britain, too, deteriorated. He played a cat and
mouse game with the British throughout his reign. Sir Mortimer Durand considered
him a ‘stubborn and unreliable ally’.
Leaving
Abdul-Rahman behind to overcome internal opposition, the British resorted to
every means to subdue the Afghan tribes in eastern Afghanistan. There were
scores of raids against the colonial authority, too. In response ‘punitive
expeditions’ were launched; collective punishments rendered; entire villages
were
destroyed to
keep ‘the tribals busy.’
They killed hundreds of thousands of Afghans and deprived millions of a peaceful
life. But they never succeeded in subjugating them. The one policy in which,
Britain was remarkably successful, however, was the use of the religious
sentiments of their opponents as a tool of ‘divide and rule.’
In 1892 the authorities had found
it very difficult to go to and open access to Kurram Valley, south west of
Peshawar. The majority of the population of this valley was Turis [Shiite].
Through kindling the religious sentiments between the Sunnis and Shiites, the
British received the following ‘petition’:
O English gentlemen! We appeal to
you in God’s name. By the Durranis [Afghan rulers] we have been ruined and
reduced to the last extremes of distress. They plunder us without restrain. With
sighs and tears we appeal to you to free us from these oppressors … Durrani rule
we loathe. For British rule we yearn … Kurram is a well favored and fertile
country. Move but a step forward and you will free us from the burden … If you
refuse aid to us, rest assured that at the last great Day of Judgment we will
seize the skirts of your garments and accurse you of this injustice before God
himself! A tall man with a silk turban will deliver this our petition. Treat him
kindly.[30]
Well, the ‘tall man’ was treated
kindly. The British moved in, in style! The religious fire between the Shiite
and Sunni communities in the region that they had started in 1892 still
continues ablaze. Any merchant of death, at any time, can blow it into flames
which consume every one and every thing around it.
The turn of the century was
accompanied with some fresh elements in British policy in India. Britain had
realized the fact that the Afghan nation can not be subjugated by force. The new
Indian Viceroy, Lord Curzon, thought it best to win the "hearts and minds" of
the Afghans. For this he moved the invisible and non-extent line
of Britain’s sphere of
influence to its visible and natural
location,
east of the Indus River at
Margala Heights. British armies were withdrawn from the Afghan territories, and
the Afghanland was no longer subject to British laws and regulations. The
country from Indus to Oxus remained under the British sphere of influence,
exercised from Delhi.
‘The Iron Amir’, who had brought
western Afghanistan under his rule with an iron hand, had died. At the end of
the great intra-Western civilization madness, called the ‘Great War’ of 1914
(which was fought not for safeguarding our "cherished values", but for
cherishing greed), the Ottoman Empire was wiped out. And by drawing those lines
in the sand, Britain’s hold on the Arab world was guaranteed.
In western Afghanistan a young
reformist Afghan King, King Amanollah, was bombed out of Kabul (the Third
Anglo-Afghan War) – in the course of a British sponsored ‘Islamic uprising’
against him. The king was declared an ‘infidel’ because he was deemed too
progressive and therefore too dangerous to
Britain’s ‘imperial
interests.’ The following is a token example of Amanollah’s vision for the
country: ‘… everyone who lives in the lands of Afghanistan is an Afghan,
irrespective of the religion he professes or the sect or class to which he
belongs and there is no distinction among Afghans. The Persian-speaking people
and the Afghans are Moslems and there is no difference between them. The Hindus,
of course, have different religious beliefs. All Hindus and Moslem students
should study in one school. For the period of theology the Hindus should go to
their special room and teachers, and the Moslems to their special room and
teacher. Separate schools should not be maintained for people of various
religion, classes or sects.’[i]
In eastern Afghanistan, a young
Afghan, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, appeared on the stage. Still a teenager, Abdul
Ghaffar (as he signs himself) had concluded that the true
path to salvation for his
people from oppression was through education. He formed an Afghan
Jirga, toured the length and
breath of the country and began in earnest to set up schools. This was contrary
to the agenda of the colonial authorities, whose political agents were busy
keeping the tribes oppressed, poor and uneducated. On 21 December 1921, he was
jailed under Article 40 of the FCR [Frontier Crimes Regulation]. Shackles on his
feet and heavy chains around his neck, Abdul Ghaffar Khan had to grind 40 Sers
of maze every day. Following three years for this ‘sedition’ behind the jail
bars, he was released in 1924 and resumed his struggle for his education drive.
The chief-commissioner of Peshawar, Sir John Maffey, reacted violently.
Abdul
Ghafar Khan wrote in his biography that when I ‘pleaded with the rulers that
education was no crime … the rejoinder was: "But if you are allowed to organize
the Pathans for social reform, what guarantee is there that this organization
will not be used against the Government and its interest? … You must apologize
and give a security that you will not do it again … This is not service, but
rebellion."
[31]
Some 89
years later, Britain hinted at reconsidering this policy. In his speech of 4th
September 2009, Prime Minister Brown talked about ‘work on education in
Afghanistan – together with the increasing focus on education in Pakistan.’ What
happens in reality, we’ll have to wait and see.
In 1929 Abdul Ghaffar Khan founded
the Khudayi Khedmatgar (Servants of God) organization. Its philosophy was
non-violence; its charter was ‘I shall never use violence, I shall not retaliate
or take revenge …’ and its aim was to work for the social improvement of the
Afghan nation. His movement for social reform was dubbed the ‘Red Shirts’ by the
imperial authorities
which, after the 1917 Bolshevik
Revolution, saw every thing "red’ and thus even more dangerous to the security
of India as well as to Islam. Speaking on the subject, Abdul Ghaffar Khan – who
was honored by the Afghans with the title of Fakhr-e Afghan, Bacha Khan –
stated:
‘The best way to face the Russians
danger is to grant us our right to become masters of our own land. We Pakhtuns
are a large community, stretching from the Amu (Oxus) to the middle of the
Punjab, and no one can dominate us. If one thinks of waging war against us, we
are willing to sacrifice everything for the protection of our country.[32]
And concerning the question of religious, the ‘non-violent soldier of Islam’,
Bacha Khan, states: “My
religion is truth, love and service to God and humanity. Every religion that has
come into the world has brought the message of love and brotherhood. Those who
are indifferent to the welfare of their fellowmen, whose hearts are empty of
love, they do not know the meaning of religion.”
Britain, however, chose Mr. Jinnah’s
‘pistol’ to divide India.
‘The partition of India in 1947 was
the only way to contain intractable religious difference as the sub-continent
moved towards independence – or so the official story goes. But this new history
reveals previously overlooked links between British strategic interests – in the
oil wells of the Middle East and maintaining access to its Indian Ocean
territories – and partition… Sarila, former ADC to Mountbatten, has drawn on
top-secret documentary evidence throwing new light on Gandhi, Jinnah,
Mountbatten, Churchill, Atlee, Wavell and Nehro amongst others. This radical
reassessment of a key moment in British colonial history is important in itself,
but also offers reason to believe that the roots of Islamic terrorism sweeping
the world today may lie in the partition of India.’
The plan:
The British government and her
imperial authorities had been engaged in developing a different strategy. The
Indian Congress’s demand for ‘Quit India’ was becoming more and more vocal. In
order to safeguard its future ‘strategic interests’ in the region, Britain then
had been saddling Mohammad Ali Jinnah to look after colonial interests in the
absence of direct British rule. The leader of the Muslim League, Mr. Jinnah, was
being ‘built’ to be the sole representative of all Muslims in India.
There had already been the
necessary tools in existence in order to facilitate such a project. In line with
the policy of divide and rule, the people of India were divided into different
‘casts’ in 1909 to vote separately. Under Chelmsford-Minto ‘reforms’ the Muslims
voted for Muslims, the Hindus for Hindus.
In 1921
the religiously based ‘Two-Nation’ theory was proposed by a British stooge
Punjabi bureaucrat, Sir Mohammed Shafi, and developed by the Viceroy of India,
Lord Reading. In a dispatch to London, the
Viceroy boasted of his personal
‘greatest
attention’ to
the scheme. He wrote: ‘I
have just sent you a telegram which will show you how near we have been to a
complete break between the Muslims and the Hindus. I have been giving the
greatest attention to this possibility, and I had the greatest assistance from
Shafi in my council, who is a highly respected Mohammedan.’
In 1943
Lord Archibald Wavell, was appointed the new Viceroy of India. In the course of
1941-42, his predecessor, Lord Linlithgow, had been the key player in
championing Mr. Jinnah to be the ‘sole spokesman’ of Indian Muslims.
Following the Second World War it
was not possible for a weakened Britain to continue its direct rule over India.
It was now the duty of Field Marshall Wavell to continue with and realize the
project at hand. Lord Wavell succeeded in crafting Jinnah to the extent through
which he could implement his plan for the continuation of Britain’s imperial
rule in the region. This was only possible by dividing India. Through the leader
of the Muslim League, Lord Wavell – as instructed by Winston Churchill– was
maturing his project to ‘keep a bit of India’ for Britain. This ‘bit of India’
was to be retained as Britain’s ‘base for defensive and offensive action against
the USSR in any future dispensation in the subcontinent.’
Concerns about the viability of
the proposed Pakistan for such a base due to its meager resources and the lack
of ‘strategic depth’ were expressed in a report by Field Marshal Claude
Auchinleck. This view, however, was in variance with what Lord Wavell had in
mind. He was quick to reject the report:
‘His Excellency the Viceroy said he
did not feel that there were final grounds for rejecting the possibility that we
might remain in North-East and North-West India [the proposed Pakistan] for
an indefinite period. He was not entirely in agreement with the
commander-in-chief that Pakistan as part of the Empire receiving British
support would be strategically incapable of being defended and of no military
advantage to the Empire. [Emphasis added][33]
[it was for gaining that ‘strategic
depth’ that Britain and the Pakistani establishment in the 1980s – in the guise
of anti-Soviet jihad – killed two million Afghans, deprived three generations of
every means of life, maimed and traumatized several millions of them, and raised
to the ground their homes and huts.]
Field Marshal Alanbrooke, a
supporter of the partition plan told Atlee on 12 April 1946 that ‘Pakistan … was
in fact militarily unsound but chaos would probably take place in India if this
scheme, which was a political one [emphasis added] was not put into
effect.[34]
Thus the play was written. All that was needed was a stage for the drama to
be played on.
The
stage on which the game was destined to be played followed soon. In order to
secure ‘a bit of India’ for Winston Churchill, Mr. Jinnah, on 27 July 1946,
announced ‘Direct Action Day’ stating that ‘Today we have forged a pistol and
are in a position to use it.’ On 13th August a proclamation – (on
which Osama Bin Laden could have modeled his various Fetwas) – for the ‘Direct
Action Day’ was issued, the text of which was ‘forwarded to London and New Delhi
from the governor’s office.’ The ‘last paragraph’ of the proclamation declared:
‘It was Ramadan that the Quran was revealed. It was in Ramadan that the
permission for jehad was granted by Allah. It was in Ramadan that the battle of
Badr, the first open conflict between Islam and heathenism, was fought and
won by 313 Muslims (against
900 in A.D. 634) and again it was Ramadan that 10,000 Muslims under the holy
prophet conquered Mecca (in A.D. 630) and established the kingdom of Heaven and
commonwealth of Islam in Arabia. The Muslim league is fortunate that it is
starting its action in this holy month.’[35]
(Compare the aforementioned with Bin Laden’s Fetwas).
On 16th of August 1946 the ‘Direct
Action Day’ came. As a result 5,000 people were killed and more than 20,000
injured.
On March 12, 1947 the new Viceroy
of India, Lord Mountbatten, arrived in Delhi. He was entrusted with the critical
task of implementing the Wavell-Jinnah plan with the utmost secrecy needed.
Mountbatten was instructed to ‘fix responsibility for the division of India
squarely on Indian shoulders…’
[36]
The Viceroy played his part
brilliantly. He told Ismay, who was a member of his delegation, that to any
Indian leader that I met, ‘I … off with my usual lecture on a strong union of
India … I was determined,’ he emphasized ‘that so far as possible the decision
whether to have a partition or not should rest on the shoulders of the Indian
people themselves and that the accusation against Britain having divided
the country should thus be avoided.’[37]
[Emphasis added]
Every scenario was thus accounted
for. One problem, however, was still to be overcome. This was concerning the
real target and the most important part of the whole scheme: the land of the
Afghans, where the Khudayi Khedmatgars were in control and Bacha Khan’s elder
brother, Dr Khan, was heading the government.
They had
won every election since
1937. ‘So long as the Khan brothers ruled the
Frontier,’ Olaf Caroe wrote,
‘Jinnah could not claim leadership of Muslim India and it was impossible even
for a moth-eaten Pakistan to emerge.’
[38]
Sir Olaf Caroe, the Governor of the
North West Frontier Province, volunteered to find a solution to this problem.
With unparalleled wide experience in the province, Caroe was a real choice.
However, in order to make the plot hitch-free and its success certain just in
case Caroe failed, Caroe-Jinnah ‘…asked Iskander Mirza to resign from the
Government of India and return to the tribal territories he knew so well. There
he was to start a jihad (Holy War) … Jinnah’s request stunned Iskander Mirza …
He knew that if the tribes were persuaded to rise in revolt, there would be
considerable bloodshed … Yet … he could not refuse Jinnah … so he told Jinnah
that money would be needed to undertake this immense task, particularly if it
involved inciting the tribesmen in Waziristan, Tirah and moh[m]and country… When
asked how much, Iskander Mirza estimated one crore of Rupees (equivalent to Rs
50 crore at the end off the twentieth century)… Iskander Mirza was given Rs
20,000 for immediate expenses and told that the Nawab of Bhopal would provide
the rest. As for cover, he would be told of it at the right time.’[39]
Pakistan was created. Olaf Caroe
had performed well. Iskandar Mirza was no longer needed. On the 16th August
1947, a day after the 15th August celebration (of the partition) the
unprecedented tragedy of religious violence of the century began. Neighbor
turned against neighbor, a thousand years of common history ‘disintegrated’ with
the ‘acid’ of ‘are you from Pakistan or India?’
[40]
‘In and around Amritsar bands of
armed Sikhs killed every Muslim they could find, while in Lahore, Muslim gangs –
many of them ‘police’ – sharpened their knives and emptied their guns at Hindus
and Sikhs. Entire train-loads of refugees were gutted and turned into rolling
coffins, funeral fires on wheels, food for bloated vultures
who darkened the skies over
Punjab.’ … Hundreds of thousands of people died in the ethnic cleansing that
followed the imposition of the new border Sir Cyril drew between India and
Pakistan. Karl Meyer, ‘The Dust of Empire", p95; and Robert Mackey, www –
Although the British departed in
1947 both the political and administrative structures and the hierarchy of
personnel with all associated functions and values remained intact.’ Dr Akbar S
Ahmad, ‘Religion and politics in the Muslim Society’, p.35 – quoted in B. G.
Wazir
Thus Britain’s politicians, who
feverishly argued that Britain invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 because it
was the “incubator of al-Qaeda,” was not the truth. The truth, as proved by
evidence, was that the "incubator" for al-Qaeda’s ideas had been manufactured
more than three centuries ago in the factories of the British colonialism. And
the ‘incubator’ of the actual al-Qaeda of the 21st Century had been
Britain’s ‘military base’ – the Wavell/Jinnah Pakistan.
The new copy mini-establishment of
the ‘Brown Sahibs’, under the watch of Governor Cunningham, unleashed its dogs
of war against the Khudayi Khedmatgars and the entire Afghan nation.
Thousands of Khdayi
Khedmatgars were slaughtered with the slogan and
sword of Islam. Their
property and livelihood were confiscated. Bacha Khan was imprisoned. He
remained for 15 years in chains behind bars during the first 18 years of
Jinnah’s Pakistan. He had spent 18 years in the ‘British Raj’ prisons. Half of a
century of this true man of God was wasted inside jails or in exile.
General Zia’s jihad of the 1980s
(the Forth British and American sponsored Afghan War); the imposition of a
minority apartheid regime on Kabul in 1992 by Britain and Pakistan; Nawaz Sarif
and General Musharraf’s plots for the destruction of the Afghan nation; the
2001 invasion (the Fifth Anglo-Afghan War); and the 2009 drone attacks and
‘punitive expeditions’ by ‘Pak-Army’ against Afghans in Swat, Buner and
Waziristan – have had all been part and parcel of the same policy, and have
proved without any shadow of doubt that Britain seeks the survival of its
‘military base’, Pakistan, in the destruction of the Afghan nation.
This continuous two-century long
campaign, the ‘Great Game’, has been indeed a game for Britain, but for the
Afghans it has been rivers of their blood, their torn flesh, and broken bones;
the death, privation and destruction of millions of their women and children;
the imposition of five major wars and some two-hundred ‘punitive expeditions.’
Let me cite here a sample of these ‘weekend wars’ against my nation:
The year was 1897. It was the
Diamond Jubilee of the Empress of India, Queen Victoria’s sixty-years on the
throne. She ruled over 372 million ‘subjects’ of the vast Empire over which the
sun never sat. On that 22 of June the sun shone in London, it was the ‘zenith of
Empire’, and hundreds of premiers, Rajas, Nawabs and a ‘large military force
ever assembled in London’ from every colony took part at the celebration.
In July of the Diamond Jubilee,
five thousand miles away from London in the Afghanland, a swift ‘punitive
expedition’ was being launched against ‘ignorant tribesmen’ in Malakand, Swat
and Bajawar’ who had been fighting against the atrocities inflicted on them by
the colonial authorities – and, according to Winston Churchill, who, ‘… had no
conception of the sensitivities of modern civilization.’
According to Churchill, the
operation against ‘these impulsive tribesmen’ was directed by Sir Bindon Blood
[well named] from ‘Castle Rock’ heights. ‘The 11th Bengal Lancers,
forming line across the plain, began a merciless pursuit up the valley. All
among the rich fields and the rocks, the strong horsemen hunted the flying
enemy. No quarter was asked or given, and every tribesman
caught was speared or cut down at once.
Their bodies lay thickly strewn
about the fields, spotting with black and white patches the high green of rice
crop. It was a terrible lesson and one which the inhabitants of Swat and Bajaur
will never forget…
In
August ‘a force of thirty-five thousand men, including sixty field canon, a
machine-gun detachment, and thirty thousands pack animals,’ began operations
against the Afridis and Orakzis in Tirha and the Kurram Valley. By mid-October
the ‘Tirah Expeditionary Force’ arrived at a ‘paradise’, the Swat Valley,
through the Samana range. ‘The passes opened onto wide cultivated fans,
terraced orchards of apricot and plum, apple, fig and orange trees. The harvest
was in; the orange sheds behind the farmhouses were brimful with corn and
barley, beans, potatoes, onions, and walnuts. In the crisp October air, the
valley looked as serene as an English landscape. "The autumn tints upon trees
are beautiful," wrote a British correspondent accompanying the expedition, "and
carry one
back to the mother country at once.
One can well imagine … this is the beautiful spot which has so inspired the
Pathan poets."
‘But the point of a punitive
campaign [was] to punish – to render the landscape so incapable of supporting
life that its inhabitants will
be
forced to surrender … the Afridis
had fled with their families and flocks to the bare ridges above the valley.
From there they watched, silent and helpless, as the Khaki coloured troops
spread out the valley. They started with the stocks. Wagonfulls of beans and
potatoes and nuts were carted out of the storehouses and the orchards were
stripped, and the trees then felled with axes or ringed to die slowly. Standing
crops were burned. As they reached a village, soldiers would hurry to sack the
houses of the Khans. Carpets and silks, copperware, furniture, and ornaments
were piled into long wagons and carted back to the camps. What was
not carrying back – utensils,
farm equipment, house-hold items –
was heaped into a pile in the centre of the village and burned. Wagonfull of
granite boulders were drawn alongside the wells and heaved in to poison the
water…
Once a village had been cleared,
demolition units laid dynamite charges along the walls and towers. By
mid-November the Tirah valley was close to being a desert, while high on the
ridge, the tribal children began succumbing to the cold… In December, the
British began a quick withdrawal and just managed to get through the Samanas
before a howling winter storm slummed the passes shut. The Afridi families were
less fortunate. With little shelter and virtually no food stocks, many of the
youngest and oldest died. [Compare with 2009 expedition by the ‘Pak-Army’].
There were some lonely voices,
however, which had the warmth of humanity in their hearts and souls. One was
Annie Besant. She ‘came close to matching Churchill’s fire, whose ‘plucky prose’
and insatiable thirst for blood ‘stirred the British back home to feel the
glamour and romance of the Frontier Wars.’ She wrote: We loudly proclaimed that
we had no quarrel with the Pathan nation, yet we burn their villages, destroy
their crops,
stole their cattle, looted their
homes, hanged their men as "rebels" if they resisted,
while we
drove out their women and
children to perish in the snow.
From out of darkness, moans of
suffering reach us, and we shrink in horror from the work which is being done in
our names. These starved babes wail out our condemnation. These frozen women cry
aloud against us. These stiffened corpses, these fire-blackened districts, these
snow-covered blood-stained plains appear to humanity to curs us. Englishmen,
with wives nestled warm in your bosoms, remember these Pathan husbands …
Englishwomen, with babes smiling on your breasts, think of these sister-women,
bereft of their little ones. The Pathan loves wife and children as you do. He
also is husband and father. To him also home is happy, the hearth is sacred. To
you he cries from his desolate fireside and from his ravaged land. In your hand
is his cause.’
112 years later, in the summer of
2009, it was the "Pak-Army", which was unleashed by the British against the same
Malakand, Swat and Waziristan.
The final word here is that of the
true servant of humanity, Fakhr-e Afghan, Bacha Khan: ‘What
crimes have the gentle Pakhtuns committed that they should be erased from the
pages of history, deprived of their land and through serfdom pushed to their
doom!… For centuries they have known no peace. They have been repeatedly ravaged
by bombardment, war and massacre. Their territory is a war zone, a training
ground for imperialist powers … All the necessities of life are denied to them.
“Thousands of people were murdered by the ancient tyrants. And as a result of
British and Pakistani authorities, lakhs of Pakhtuns who could have been a
strong nation in Asia and served the cause of humanity, have been divided and
devastated, gradually erased from the map of the world and wiped out. My crusade
today is against this injustice. What crimes have the gentle Pakhtuns committed
that they should be erased from the pages of history, deprived of their land and
through serfdom pushed to their doom!
“I want to knit the divided
tribes of the Pakhtuns, spread out from Baluchistan to Chitral, into one
community, one brotherhood, so that they can share their sorrows and sufferings
and can play a vital role in serving humanity. We have been painted black in the
eyes of the world by aliens. The doors are shut upon us, none is allowed to
reach us, and we have been presented as a collection of uncivilized, wild
tribes… During all these dark and evil days for centuries, spreading from the
Mogul reign to British rule and Pakistani regime, these helpless people have
been subjected to tyranny… They seldom enjoy a long spell of peaceful
coexistence … for centuries they have known no peace. They have been repeatedly
ravaged by bombardment, war and massacre. Their territory is a war zone, a
training ground for imperialist powers. They have no schools or hospitals. Like
untended, wild daisies, they bloom and fade away in mountain ridges. All the
necessities of life are denied to them … I wonder what the pathetic world
expects of them! The world should have lavished love and sympathy on these
handsome, healthy youthful girls and boys; instead man-eaters have been let
loose on them and injury has been added to insult. I long to save the gentle,
brave, proud, patriotic and chivalrous Pakhtuns from the tyranny of aliens and
create for them a free world, where they can grow in peace, comfort and
happiness.
“I want to kiss the earth heaped
on the ruins of their homes devastated by brutal people. With my own hands I
want to wash their blood-stained cloths. I want to sweep their lanes and humble
mud huts. Before the eyes of the world I want them to stand on their legs with
head erect, and then want to throw this challenge: ‘Show me another decent,
gentle and cultured race like them!’
The
Afghan nation can no longer bear the sufferings and tyranny to which they have
been subjected to – and still continue mercilessly – for the last two centuries.
The culture of terrorism, which is not an Afghan product, should be eliminated.
The way out of this vicious circle is through breaking the mould. And the only
way for
‘regional
stability’ is to allow every
historical nation under the occupation of the Punjabi establishment – the
Punjabis, Pashtuns, Baluch and Sindhis – to become masters of their own lands
and of their own destiny. Otherwise expecting stability and peace will be no
more than delusion and self-deception.
يا
ربه توفيق!
غلام محمد زرملوال
[1] Sykes, ‘History of
Persia’, Vol. II – p.
299.
[2] T.A. Heathcote, ‘The Afghan Wars 1839-1919’ – p. 30
[3] Charles Miller, ‘Khyber’, – p. 32.
[4] T. A. Heathcote – p. 30
[5] Ibid. – p. 60.
[6] Peter Hopkirk, ‘Playing The Great Game’, p. 200
[7] Andre Singer, p. 71
[8] Schofield, p. 78
[9] Peter Hopkirk, p. 277
[10] Ibid. – p. 69.
[11] Charles Miller, ‘Khyber’, 1977 London – p. 85
[12] Schofield, p. 84
[13] Ibid p. 85
[14] Olaf Caroe, ‘The Pathans’ – p. 329
[15] Charles Miller, Khyber. P. 132
[16] Olaf Caroe, – p. 107. Captain John Nicholson was appointed as
Commissioner to Banu district, south-west of
Peshawar.
[17] Charles Miller, ‘Khyber’ – p152.
[18] S. Gopal, British policy in India, 1857-1905, p. 43 – quoted in
Arghandawi, p. 61
[19] Letter dated
3 April 1869 from H.H. the Amir to
H.E. the Viceroy, quoted in Frazer Tytler, ‘Afghanistan’ – p132.
[20] T.A. Heathcote, ‘The Afghan wars’, – p85.
[21] T.A. Heathcote – p88.
[22] Ibid, p. 91
[23] T.E. Heathcote – pp89-91.
[24] Charles Miller, ‘Khyber’, – p160.
[25] GM Ghobar, ‘Afghanistan
on the Path of History’, – p602.
[26] Charles Miller, ‘Khyber’ – p165.
[27] T.A. Heathcote – p91.
[28] Charles Miller, ‘Khyber’, – p183
[29] T. A. Heathcote, ‘The Afghan Wars’, – p118
[30] Schofield, p. 137
[31] Abdul Ghaffar Khan – faith is a battle, D.G. Tendulkar,
published for Gandhi Peace Foundation, Bombay, 1967, p. 37
31 Fakhr-e Afghan, 1931, quoted in
Victoria Schofield, p. 216
32 Sirila p. 210
33 Ibid p. 244
34 Ibid p. 27336 Ibid Humayun
Mirza, From Plassey to Pakistan (Rowan and Littlefield Publishers,
Oxford, UK, 1999, pp.151-52) – quoted in Serila pp 305-06 37 Ibid p. 274 [31]
Caroe papers IORL, MSS Eur F 203/1 [31] Kamila Shamsie, ‘burnt shadows’, p. 105.
